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Review Article 
Civil–Military Relations during Transition 
and Post-Democratisation Periods:  
A View from Southeast Asia 
Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge 
Abstract: The civil–military dynamic in Southeast Asia has been a con-
tested issue for years. Although most countries in the region have been 
undertaken democratic governance, the military role in politics remains 
relatively unresolved. After having relatively stable civilian governments 
for over a decade, the Thai military launched another coup in 2014 to 
topple a democratically elected government. In Indonesia and the Phil-
ippines, the military has been moderately controlled by the democratical-
ly elected civilian governments, but their professional roles in sustaining 
democratic principles and values are also questionable. Accordingly, the 
crucial issues are the role that the military plays in the transition period, 
such as in Thailand, and the degree to which the military is institutional-
ised under civilian control in nascent democracies, such as Indonesia and 
the Philippines. These issues are addressed in the books discussed herein.  
  Manuscript received 4 January 2017; accepted 2 October 2017 
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The military plays a critical role in shaping the government pathway in 
many developing countries. Western countries establish the military as a 
coercive agency that is democratically controlled and has oversight from 
the civilian government. In many developing countries, by contrast, the 
military can act also as a government or a junior partner of civilian gov-
ernment and can rule, dominate or highly influence the country for years. 
Even though the number of military and quasi-military regimes has de-
clined since the third wave of democracy, the military’s ambition and 
capability to exert influence to take office and rule a country lingers.  
In Southeast Asia, the debate over civil–military relations is still rel-
evant. Some countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, that were 
once ruled by military-backed regimes have undertaken a democratic 
consolidation process. In other countries, such as Myanmar and Thai-
land, the military can govern the country relatively easily, despite the 
democratic transition and consolidation periods being underway or hav-
ing passed. However, my focus here is on three countries in Southeast 
Asia, namely Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. These countries 
have all experienced military-backed regimes in their modern histories. 
One of them, Thailand, is still showing the massive role of the military in 
its governments.  
The debate over military involvement in politics in the Southeast 
Asian region is focused on several stances: structural vs. agency strains; 
an institutional separation vs. a regional adjustment; a cohesive vs. fac-
tionalised military; a modernisation approach vs. a regime protector: and 
demolishing vs. guarding military privileges. Certain credible studies on 
the issue have used these stances, such as Stephen Hadley, Marcus 
Mietzner, the two separate volumes edited by Muthiah Alagappa, and 




Aurel Croissant et al. (Hoadley 2012; Mietzner 2011; Alagappa 2002; 
Croissant, Kuehn, and Lorenz 2012). Although these scholars differ in 
their elucidation of the decisive factors that shape the path of democratic 
transition and consolidation, and of the roles the military should play in 
two critical periods of democracy, they generally agree that the key con-
cern in many developing countries is how to sustain democratic values 
and practices, particularly once the elected civilian government establish-
es civilian control over the military.  
The books written by Lee and Woo provide sequential arguments 
with no comprehensive explanations of how the civilian government 
institutionalised civilian control over the military during recent transition 
(Thailand) and post-democratisation (Indonesia and the Philippines) 
periods in Southeast Asia. Zoltan’s book discusses the role of democratic 
army in a transition period but makes no thorough arguments about how 
civilian control over the military can result in effectiveness of the military 
organisation in terms of defence and security policy-making processes in 
post-democratisation countries, particularly in Southeast Asia. Only 
Croissant et al. provide a plausible discussion on the institutionalisation 
of civilian control leading to the degree of military effectiveness that can 
be implemented during a consolidated democratic period, particularly in 
Indonesia.  
In line with the debate over structure vs. agency, Lee focuses on the 
military as an actor that is either unified or fragmented in response to 
regime change. Woo and Zoltan provide structural context in which the 
military operates its strategies and resources to either counter or favour 
regime transition to democracy. The book edited by Aurel Croissant and 
David Kuehn discusses how the structural and agency approaches are 
combined, with specific focus on civilian control and military effectives, 
to shed light on civil–military dynamics in nascent democracies.  
Four important arguments of the books are: the factors that drive 
the military to become a political actor and a partner of the civilian gov-
ernment; the military’s response to critical situations; the conditions 
supportive to the military’s becoming a democratic military; and how the 
civilian control can be institutionalised and its implications on the mili-
tary organisation within nascent democratic countries. However, I argue 
in this review that these works have several shortcomings. Before I dis-
cuss further these weaknesses, I will highlight the arguments of each of 
the authors.  
Lee’s book proposes an institutional setting of the regimes as a pri-
mary factor that determines the role of the military during transition 
period from authoritarian to democratic governments or extends the 
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longevity of an authoritarian regime. By illuminating the interplay be-
tween institutions and actors, Lee argues that the character of autocratic 
regimes can determine people’s actions, particularly those of the military 
in response to popular mobilisation; these military actions, in turn, pave 
the way to either democratisation or maintenance of the regime. On the 
one hand, an authoritarian regime will be defended against popular pro-
tests if the autocratic leader shares power among elites, including the 
military. On the other hand, if the regime is ruled by a personalistic pat-
tern in which power is concentrated in the hands of one figure, there is 
greater elite liability for fragmentation and that will create more oppor-
tunities to defect from the regime when an uprising erupts. This scenario 
is particularly the case with a military that has been politicised as an insti-
tution. 
In the case of the Philippines and Indonesia, the personalistic pat-
tern that characterised the Marcos and Suharto presidencies was a driv-
ing force for the military to side with civil society and overthrow the 
authoritarian regimes. Otherwise, the patronage system and power shar-
ing among the elites enabled the military under the State Peace and De-
velopment Council (SPDC) to defend the junta in Myanmar against 
demonstrations in 2007 (170) and extend the military junta regime. 
On the contrary, Jongseok Woo argues that threats, both internal 
and external, have prompted the military to play more roles domestically 
to counter such threats. Accordingly, threats are a primary structural 
cause that may lead the military to be politically influential. The critical 
contribution of Woo’s book is the extent to which the military’s in-
volvement in domestic politics depends on the degree of threats faced by 
the country and, in turn, will provide different trajectories of the mili-
tary’s involvement in the domestic sphere. Accordingly, the different 
modes of domestic intervention will be determined by three important 
factors: military cohesiveness, civilian leadership, and civil society. 
High external and internal threats will expand military organisation, 
lead the civilian leaders to favour the military and, in turn, make the 
military a source of regime survival. The military not only defends the 
nation against foreign occupation and internal insurgencies as a coercive 
actor, but also provides a basis to claim the right to become a political 
actor that could involve itself in domestic matters.  
Internal threats from communist rebellions and Muslim insurgen-
cies paved the way for Ferdinand Marcos to politicise the military for his 
own interest for over 20 years in power. A politicised army was a back-
bone of Marcos’ regime and gradually transformed the mind-set of the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to become a crucial political 




actor during the transition and consolidation periods. Even during post-
democratisation regimes, such as those of Arroyo’s and Aquino Jr., in-
ternal military appointment was a source of political patronage to the 
regimes. In Indonesia, a struggle against the Dutch occupation paved the 
way for the Indonesian military (TNI) to claim a birth-right principle, in 
which the military was also an institution that created a nation-state 
(Ringgi 2012). Moreover, communist and Islamist rebellions, as well as 
regional insurgencies, gave the military the opportunity to become a 
dominant political actor after 1965, with the former General Suharto 
making the military a junior partner of the government for more than 30 
years.  
To complement the argument of institutional and structural condi-
tions of the military role, Barany Zoltan’s book proposes a concept of a 
democratic army as the means of controlling the military from interven-
ing in the nation-state building process. As he puts it, the military is the 
most important institution for boosting the government politically. Di-
verse political and socioeconomic environments make the military adapt-
able to either challenge or support the regime. Therefore, the military as 
a subject to be democratised is a crucial factor before the civilian gov-
ernment subordinates it under democratic principles. 
Zoltan argues that when the military agrees to support the newly 
elected government, the latter must create a supportive condition in 
order for the military to perform its primary task. Zoltan argues that 
there are three primary settings to be considered – the after-war, regime 
change, and state transformation – in order to keep the military under 
civilian control. Accordingly, the four essential functions are (1) shared 
responsibility between the executive and the legislative branches to over-
see the defence sector, particularly personnel, the organisational setting, 
weapons procurement, and financial decisions; (2) a relationship among 
the executive branch, particularly the president or prime minister, the 
defence minister, and the armed forces within the military chain of 
command. In this regard, the military will help to advise its civilian coun-
terparts on all security- and defence-related matters and the civilian lead-
ers will give orders to the military based on democratic constitutional 
rights; (3) internal reforms of the military that can respond to the dynam-
ics of a democratic system; and (4) the social recruitment and composi-
tion of the officers to reflect the society’s cultural and gender variation.  
In Southeast Asia, Zoltan highlights the importance adjustment 
conditions of the military to the democratic condition. Thailand’s mili-
tary could not support its democratically elected government since the 
military was unwilling to respond to different political economic condi-
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tions after electoral politics emerged in the early 2000s. In contrast, the 
Indonesian military could manage to become part of the democratic 
regime without as much political leverage as it had during the Suharto’s 
authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, the civilian government still has work 
to do, particularly to control the military’s business-related activities, 
which are under less oversight; to hold the military accountable for its 
past and recent human right abuses (for example, in Papua, some offic-
ers related to past human rights cases received promotion to upper-
ranking positions); and to firmly institutionalise its control over so-called 
military operations other than war.  
The edited book by Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn provides 
significant insights into how civil–military relations are managed through 
civilian control and military effectiveness. Civilians create national poli-
cies through an institutional process that is unimpeded by formal military 
prerogatives and informal contestation. As a result, the military can have 
the capability to fulfil its national defence role and mission based on 
strategic planning, institutional arrangement, financial resources. The 
degree of civilian control is categorised as high if the military does not 
challenge the civilian authority through the military privileges and con-
testations; medium if the military enjoys certain privileges, including politi-
cal power, due to formal regulations, but does not dominate the political 
arena; and low if the military dominates decision-making and implementa-
tion in the civilian institutional process.  
For Croissant and Kuehn, the interrelationship of civilian control 
and military effectiveness is an integrative approach in which civil-
military dynamics are shaped by historical, cultural, political, societal and 
international factors. Accordingly, both military and civilian actions are 
constrained by institutional policies, in that the former has to follow 
orders created politically by the latter. In this regard, civilian control can 
maximise military effectiveness for two reasons. First, defence and mili-
tary policies are national policies that garner public support; thus, the 
civilian government will favour solid defence and security policies. Sec-
ond, the civilian government reflects a national perspective rather than 
organisational biases on defence issues; thus, it will eliminate potential 
internal-military divisions, based on different service branches, that could 
pursue their own interests instead of the public interest. As a result, civil-
ian control and military effectiveness are highly determined by the inter-
ests of relevant actors and also the international context in which the 
national defence and military reforms operate.  
In the case of Indonesia, civilian control and military effectiveness 
have been partially achieved and implemented. As a legacy of the New 




Order, a military-backed regime, in terms of military domination in poli-
cy-making, is still relatively intact. In his discussion of Minimum Essen-
tial Force (MEF), Aditya Gunawan elucidates that civilian control and 
military effectiveness are relatively medium. MEF is a relatively ambitious 
plan for military posture development, covering three phases from 2010 
to 2024. Through MEF, civilians have limited influence on the policy-
making process, particularly on defence policy formulation and imple-
mentation, and also on oversight of the policy (p. 141). Accordingly, the 
MEF, which lacks solid doctrinal and operational structures, has no 
doctrinal adjustment to reflect change in geopolitical conditions. Indone-
sia’s national defence is still based on a territorial-warfare strategy and 
people mobilisation – a legacy from the revolutionary war for independ-
ence.  
The lack of civilian authority on military organisation policy also 
impedes joint command innovation among the three military services. 
Gunawan further highlights the programme of the Joint Regional De-
fence Command (Kogabwilhan), which serves as the first deterrent force 
against external intruders, receives strong opposition from the military, 
particularly from the army, which enjoys the current territorial command 
structure across the country. In this regard, modern command and oper-
ation structures do not have strong acceptance among Indonesian mili-
tary officers, due partly to the long-running conception of the New Or-
der regime, which positioned the Indonesian military as a social force 
instead of a professional force. Another constraining factor on military 
effectiveness is the lack of a solid institutional arrangement on national 
defence and military policies among relevant actors. Two examples are 
the overlapping authority of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the 
Indonesian military (TNI) headquarters, and the lack of a civilian role 
and expertise on defence issues in the legislative arena. As a result, when 
the TNI signed memorandums of understanding with several govern-
ment agencies to deploy army personnel for non-defence duties – teach-
ers and “agriculture consultants” – there was no rejection from the MoD, 
which has the authority, based on the 2000 Law on State Defence, over 
TNI deployment for military operations other than war. In addition, the 
Indonesian parliament has been unable to thoroughly and effectively 
oversee the implementation of a military reform agenda, due partly to 
lack of defence expertise and also to regular rotation of parties, which 
hampers members of parliament from accumulating relevant expertise. 
Since the downfall of Suharto in 1998, the Indonesian military is still 
trying to find the right pathway to adapt to democratic principles that 
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enhance civilian control over the defence and military organisation poli-
cies, which are still clearly problematic.  
All of these authors provide linked arguments – namely, institution-
al, structural and agency approaches – in order to elucidate how the 
military is involved in the domestic scene. Accordingly, the military is not 
merely a coercive actor but also a political actor, particularly during any 
transition period from authoritarianism to democracy. However, the 
insights provided by these three authors offer little in terms of explaining 
how the military has found an appropriate role in recent consolidation 
periods, particularly in Thailand and post-democratisation periods, such 
as in Indonesia and the Philippines. One important aspect of seeking an 
appropriate role is the institutionalisation of civil–military relations by 
undertaking deep military reforms in order to sustain democratic values 
and practices.  
Concerning the pathway to initiating deep military reforms, Aurel 
Croissant et al. provide three important factors: power strategies, legiti-
mation, and even compensation (Croissant et al. 2013: 49). These factors 
are used by the democratic civilian government to ascertain whether 
military reforms can be implemented or not, after a country has em-
barked on its consolidation period following the transition from authori-
tarianism.  
Lee’s book discusses regime type as a primary resource for provid-
ing political choices for both civilians and the military in times of crisis 
within the government and the effects toward the nation’s stability; how-
ever, it does not provide a clear argument regarding the basis on which 
these competing actors can legitimate their actions related to that crisis. 
Woo’s argument emphasises more the structural context of security 
threats combined with the institutional arrangement – that is, the 
strength of civilian leadership, military cohesiveness, and civil society – 
as the primary driving force that shape civil-military relations, most im-
portantly during the transition period. However, security threats have 
less to do with the strategies adopted by the democratically elected civil-
ian government in the consolidation period, particularly when options to 
push deeper internal military reforms are available, such as in the Philip-
pines and Indonesia. In contrast, the civilian governments in Thailand 
have not displayed a high degree of interest in what constitutes security 
threats other than internal strife between competing political factions 
within the country.  
Zoltan’s book explains efforts to democratically institutionalise the 
civil–military relations in Southeast Asian countries. According to Zoltan, 
building a democratic army is advanced by supportive conditions under 




which the military can operate within a consolidated democratic regime. 
In this regard, by accepting the democratic regime, the military must 
undergo internal military reform. However, the book does not specifical-
ly discuss either the areas in which the military can be prompted to make 
such reforms, or the basis of legitimacy or compensation from the civil-
ian government from which the military can make them. In explaining 
this gap, Croissant et al. provide useful arguments on five key areas in 
which civilian control of the military can be measured and the extent to 
which internal military reform can be implemented; namely, elite re-
cruitment, public policy, internal security, national defence, and military 
organisation. All five decision-making areas have to be based on the 
cultural and historical conditions of the society.  
As a result of the lack of a clear pathway to institutionalise civil-
military relations in the democratic consolidation period, the military 
may even use democratic means to regain its power, as occurred in Thai-
land. Accordingly, Thailand’s army under General Prayuth Chan Ocha is 
the key actor that determined how Thailand set a democratic pathway 
after the coup in 2014. Additionally, the military-drafted constitution has 
guaranteed the military seats in the executive and legislative branches. 
In the case of the Philippines, the institutionalisation of civilian con-
trol in an internal security policy has been low, particularly during the 
administration of Rodrigo Duterte. Through his campaign on drugs and 
terrorism in the southern part of the country, the military regained its 
domination over internal security policy-making. Accordingly, the Duter-
te’s government allowed the military to support his public campaign on 
drugs, which cost many civilian lives without legal consequences. In 
addition, the military campaign against an Islamic state-backed group in 
Marawi has paved the way for the military to dominate the decision-
making process on defence and internal security spheres without solid 
oversight and critique from the parliament and civil society organisations.  
All of the privileges held by the Indonesian military are traceable to 
the character of a political military, particularly through the army territo-
rial commands, which have not been thoroughly reduced or reorganised. 
Although the military does not have an official political role like it had 
during the authoritarian regimes, a so-called “informal political network” 
does exist. This network, which ranges from national to local levels, is 
established through retired military officers who occupy ministerial posi-
tions or have access to the executive circle. The network can be used to 
hamper any initiatives from civil society to push for more internal mili-
tary reforms that would embrace civilian perspectives. In the current 
administration, Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo has even placed 
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some retired “conservative” generals in strategic security-related minis-
tries such as the coordinating ministry of politics, legal and security af-
fairs; and the Ministry of Defence, as well as the national intelligence 
agency. With these appointments, the prospect of continuing military 
reforms to be more adaptable to the Indonesia’s surrounding external 
threats and deep-seated democratic values, which were stalled during the 
former general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency, are less likely 
to be enacted since these former army generals have absolutely no inten-
tion of putting such reforms into a government agenda.  
In addition, since Joko Widodo only relies only on his office power, 
without a strong political base, he has to forge political allies with differ-
ent organisations, including the military, which has been gradually dis-
playing its profile as a social force instead of a professional force. As 
result, the TNI Commander Gatot Nurmantyo can express his political 
ambitions publicly, although this is at odds with democratic features of 
strong civilian control over the military organisation.  
The civilian governments of Thailand, Indonesia and the Philip-
pines have no interest in deeply and thoroughly institutionalising civilian 
control over the military, particularly at the civilian-elite and military-elite 
level of relations. These facts will inhibit any efforts to push an agenda 
of further and deep military reform, regarding, for example, the military 
justice system, military businesses, and civilisation of the MoD. In Indo-
nesia, reform would also include the restructuring of territorial command 
into a joint regional defence command.  
Civil–military relations in Southeast Asia have another shortcoming 
which is not discussed in these four books. The perception of the citi-
zenry is relatively overlooked in explaining the dynamic relations be-
tween the military and civilians. The relations described by the authors 
are merely those between the state and the military as a part of the state; 
they do not include society. There is no agreement, however, between 
the political elite, the military, and the citizenry about the role the mili-
tary should play during the post-coup period in Thailand and post-
democratisation in Indonesia and the Philippines. In this regard, as Ra-
chel Schiff (2009) argues, the military’s involvement in the domestic 
sphere will be determined by the extent to which all three partners can 
reach a consensus, which will have to be based on the cultural and his-
torical conditions of society. In all four books the lack of cultural and 
historical settings lead to a lack of thorough explanation of why the mili-
tary is still perceived as the guardian of the state in Thailand and the 
Philippines and as the most trusted, non-corrupt institution in Indonesia. 
In Thailand, where there is a societal perception of the military as a key 




instrument to return order, the coup was seen as a part of the culture 
(Farrelly 2013). In addition, human rights abuses committed by the mili-
tary are still tolerated by society in each of the three countries.  
Another missing point is that the authors have focused heavily on 
the elites’ perception of the dynamics of civil–military relations in the 
region. In this regard, an elite-driven concept of the military discourages 
the role of low-ranking officers who participate in military operational 
duties on a daily basis. During a regime crisis, low-ranking officers risk 
their lives since they are on the front line in containing popular protests. 
Likewise, in Thailand, one faction of the military refused to suppress the 
red movement in a series of protests in Bangkok in 2006. One military 
faction’s stance reflected its connection with rural areas in north and 
north-eastern parts of Thailand, which is where the majority of red 
movement members come from. Nevertheless, the military’s elites ig-
nored such an attitude from such a group, preferring a harsher approach 
to containing the popular uprising. 
Moreover, these officers can be manipulated by their commanders 
to protect the many military businesses that do not have oversight from 
a legislative branch within a democratic system. These officers can even 
be implicated in the businesses. It is widely known that the commanders 
and the military elites abused their power by using low-ranking officers 
as a means of conducting illegal business activities, ranging from provid-
ing security services, such as in Indonesia, and the Philippines; to occu-
pying civilian departments, such as in Thailand.  
Although these four works provide little discussion of the afore-
mentioned shortcomings, they are highly recommended to anyone inter-
ested in the dynamics of democracy in Southeast Asia, particularly the 
role of the military in the recent transition and post-democratisation 
periods. These aforementioned authors, with their expertise on the issue 
of civil-military relations, have provided advanced insights that may form 
a bridge from the lack of discussion on the role of the military in South-
east Asia to a more thorough conceptualisation.  
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